Synopsis
Despite referendums, the process of constitutional reform will be largely determined by parliament. The attitudes of politicians, particularly Labour MPs, are likely to play a critical role here. Therefore this paper addresses the question whether there is now a consensus in parliament, particularly among Labour MPs, in support of the constitutional reform agenda.
The conclusion considers the implications of the analysis for patterns of party competition and for prospects of constitutional reform in Brita in.
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Parliamentary Elites and Constitutional Change
During the last decade constitutional engineering has risen to become one of the most critical issues on the British political agenda. Many factors have mobilised the debate about reform (see, for example, accounts by Hennessy 1995; Marr 1995a Marr , 1995b ).
Yet it was Labour's conversion to constitutional modernisation as official party policy which moved prospects for reform from margin to mainstream (Norris 1995; Marquand 1992 ).
This process culminated in the 1997 Labour manifesto with an ambitious programme of reform covering a wide range of issues including devolution of powers from Westminster, reform of the electoral system, incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law, abolishing the right of hereditary peers to sit in the House of Lords, establishing an elected mayor for London, introducing a Freedom of Information Act, creating a lasting settlement in Northern Ireland, modernising parliamentary procedures, and improving standards of public life. The manifesto 'contract' pledged that during the lifetime of a Labour government: "We will clean up politics, decentralise political power throughout the United Kingdom, and put the funding of political parties on a proper and accountable basis ." (New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better: 5).
All these proposals can be regarded as 'constitutional' issues, broadly defined in the We stminster tradition, since to a greater or lesser extent they affect the basic institutional and procedural rules of the political game and the continuous and evolving set of arrangements for government. This shake -up of conventions is seen as part of Tony Blair's attempts to sweep away the dusty old stereotypes of 'Beefeater Britain' to replace them with a modern parliamentary democracy. The outlines of the new constitutional settlement are starting to emerge nevertheless many proposed reforms are likely to face serious political obstacles. Commentators like Dunleavy (1997) remain skeptical about how far the Blair government will deliver on all its manifesto commitments, if it hits the mid -term rocks.
Labour's conversion to constitutional reform seems critical to any prospect for its success. The puzzle is to explain why this conversion occurred, given the conventional wisdom about the role of cynical selfinterest driving proposals for reform.
Why should any ra tional votemaximising party, which just won the largest parliamentary majority since 1935, opt to change the electoral rules of the game under which they succeeded? And, in the same manner, why should the Conservatives set their face against devolution, when some estimates suggest they might become the official opposition party in a Scottish parliament with an AMS electoral system (Curtice 1996 (Curtice , 1997 Dyer 1997) . Electoral advantage is commonly seen as the driving force in explanations of constitutional reform, but these developments suggest that political principles beyond cynical self -interest may also prove influential.
To understand the driving factors behind reform we can analyze the attitudes of politicians. Despite the important role of referendums, the process of constitutional reform will be largely determined by parliament. Politicians, particularly Labour MPs, are likely to play a critical role here.
Official Labour party policy has c hanged but it is not clear whether this shift has been imposed by the leadership or whether changes in policy are reflected in backbench attitudes. Is the parliamentary Labour party divided between modernisers, compromisers and traditionalists on these issues, or have they been converted?
To explore these matters, this paper analyzes the distribution of opinion, in particular whether there is now a consensus in parliament, particularly among Labour MPs, in support of the constitutional reform agenda. The paper describes the data drawn from the British Representation Study, 1997 then maps out elite opinion towards reform. Lastly, the conclusion considers the implications of the results for patterns of party competition in Britain and for insights into the process driving constitutional reform.
The British Representation Study 1997
To [ Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
Overall responses among politicians are heavily skewed in favour of reform, with the majority supporting a referendum on electoral reform, the introduction of PR and public funding of parties, and more than two-thirds favouring reform of the Lords and the establishment of a written constitution. A broadly similar pattern is found among Members of Parliament, with almost three -quarters supporting replacing the House of Lords with an elected second chamber and public funding of parties.
Yet the other stri king finding in the distribution of attitudes revealed in survey is how far constitutional reform now deeply divides British politicians (see Table  1 ). Reform has become a cleavage rather than a consensual issue, sharply demarcating the Conservative party in government from all other politicians. In the past it was often assumed that the left -right economic cleavage on issues such as privatization and government spending represented the basic and most enduring division in British p arty politics, one which polarised in the early 1980s due to the influence of Thatcherism. In contrast, in the post-war period the manifestoes of the major parties shared a broad consensus on constitutional issues. Parties became somewhat more polarised on these issues in the early 1970s, due to Labour's shift towards devolution, but the difference by party was much smaller than the cleavage over the economy (see, for example, Norris 1997: 151 -177). Yet evidence from the 1997 BRS shows that in terms of MP's attitudes, the post -war consensus on constitutional issues has shifted, and shifted decisively. A chasm has opened on these issues between the Conservatives, who while in government overwhelmingly opted for preserving the status quo, and all other parties who advocated reform (see Figure 1) . A similar pattern was found across all items.
There were slightly fewer Labour than Liberal Democrat politicians in the reform camps, and the difference betwee n these parties was greatest on the issue of proportional representation. Nevertheless the gap between Labour and Liberal Democrats was always far less than the canyon between Conservatives in government and all opposition politicians.
Standards of Public Life
The Nolan inquiry highlighted a wide range of issues concerning standards of public life. The BRS survey included a battery of 13 items designed to see how politicians these issues, such as whether they believed that most MPs have a high moral code or whether they will tell lies when it suits them politically (see Appendix B). Based on principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation three major dimensions emerged from these items concerning attitudes towards political finance; towards moral standards of public life; and towards the rewards of being an MP. These items can also be turned into consistent intercorrelated scales for subsequent analysis.
[ Table 2 about here] The results (in Table 2 [ Table 3 about here] When some of these evaluations are compared with public opinion it is apparent that the politicians had a far rosier image of their moral standards than the public (see Table  3 ). Hence only 13% of politicians believed that 'm ost MPs make a lot of money using public office improperly', compared with almost two -thirds of the public. Similar mass-elite differences were evident in evaluations of the morality and honesty of MPs.
As an alternative indicator, to understand the normative ethics which operate among politicians, the BRS included an eight item battery asking whether it was right or not right to accept certain perks and privileges open to MPs (see Appendix B for details). Factor analysis divided attitudes towards these items fairly clearly into two categories, distinguishing between perceptions of legitimate perks of the job and those actions which were widely regarded as stepping over the moral line.
[ Table 4 about here]
As shown in Table 4 In many ways politicians' responses on Scottish devolution are the most predictable out of all the attitudes which we have examined, perhaps reflecting the fact that here we are asking about policy proposals which have long been settled as the subject of party debate.
Conclusions and Discussion
At the end of the twentieth century the modernisation of the British constitution has also gradually bubbled to the center of the political agenda. Long-term conditions which contributed towards this include significant challenges to the two -party system at Westminster, the disproportionality of the British electoral system, a rising tide of nationalism in Scotland, and a series of political scandals which have eroded public confidence in the political system (Norris 1995 Wellpublicised problems of party donations have also afflicted the Blair administration, opening issues of public financing for parties to the scrutiny of Sir Patrick Neill, chair of the Parliamentary Standards Committee. In Northern Ireland, a pattern of 'two -steps-forward, onestep back' progress in the peace talks, initiated under Major, promises a new settlement in the province.
Pressure for constitutional change in mainland Britain has long been maintained, often against the odds, by a center-left coalition led by the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the SNP. The inclusion of Liberal Democrats as well as Labour members on a cabinet sub-committee considering reform options signalled a major breakthrough in cross -party cooperation.
Yet, as argued earlier, it was Labour's conversion which has been critical for any prospect of success. The Labour man ifesto set out an ambitious programme of reform touching on most, although not all, aspects of the constitutional settlement. Whether this programme is adopted depends upon many factors, including support from Labour MPs when these issues are debated in the Commons.
In seeking to explain support for reform, we found that politicians divided sharply on these issues, with those in the governing Conservative party far more strongly in favour of the status quo while members of opposition parties opted for reform. This cleavage was not simply a product of differences in official party policies, like manifesto pledges on electoral reform, since the gap was also evident in the moral ethos of standards of parliamentary life.
The implications of this analysis suggest that the momentum of the reform movement, which has gradually been gathering steam in Britain since the early 1970s, has influenced attitudes in the Labour party. The Conservatives clearly remain opposed to most aspects of this reform, but given the size of the Labour landslide this is unlikely to prove a serious obstacle to legislation. Perhaps attitudes in the Labour party will change once in power, this remains to be seen. There are many reasons why Labour's proposals may be watered down, modified or simply abandoned in the next few years (Dunleavy 1997). Sitting on the government side of the house might influence attitudes, and only time will tell whether Labour's conversio n was temporary or permanent. But if Labour's ambitious programme on reform is indeed implemented this promises to produce a great reform parliament. What this study demonstrates is that this change is not just a matter of official party policy, but instead receives the widespread backing of Labour, Liberal Democrat and nationalist politicians. There are many steps before this programme of reform is passed and implemented, and many problems en route, but, as we are abo ut to enter the twenty first century, the end of Beefeater Britain may, perhaps, possibly, be nigh. Table 4 Standards of Morality for MPs ___________________________________________________________________ % 'Right to accept' Table 7 The Impact of Interests and Values on Moral Standards Scale ______________________________________________________________________________________ Table 8 The Impact of Interests and Values on Political Finance Scale ______________________________________________________________________________________ The project used a mail survey which was sent out to all candidates selected by the main British parties (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP, Plaid Cymru, and Green) by 1st June 1996. The Labour and Conservative parties had chosen about 600 candidates a t this stage, although other parties had selected fewer. The first wave of the survey was sent out, with an official covering letter from each party, from 18th June to 3rd July 1996. A post -card reminder was sent out two weeks later, followed by a third wave with a complete questionnaire and reminder letter in mid to late July.
Norris
--------------------------------------------------------------------
In total 1,628 questionnaires were sent out and we received 999 replies, representing a response rate of 61.4 percent. The survey includes 179 MPs elected in 1992 and 277 MPs elected in 1997. In addition, we received 122 refusals (7.5 percent), usually from MPs who noted that as a matter of policy they never responded to any surveys. The response rate indicates a fairly even balance between parties although the rate of return was higher among candidates than incumbent MPs. See Table  A1 . Strongly agree/ agree/ disagree/ strongly disagree.
POLITICAL FINANCE DIMENSION:
It is a good thing for MPs to have another paid job because it keeps them in touch with the outside world
Political parties need to be properly funded by the government to do their job properly
MPs should be banned from all consultancies and outside interests Any individual who gives money to a political party should be allowed to keep their gift private if they wish There should be a limit on how muc h money a single individual can give to a political party 
STANDARDS OF MORALITY DIMENSION:
